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Essay: 
The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital Clemency 
Adam M. Gershowitz• 
"[C]lemency has not traditionally 'been the business of courts. "'1 
-The Supreme Court of the United States 
On denying clemency to Gary Graham: "He's had full and fair access to the 
courts. "2 
-Governor George W. Bush 
"The appeals process, although lengthy, provides many opportunities for the 
courts to review sentences and that's where these [death-penalty] decisions 
should be made. ''3 
-Governor Bill Clinton 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States has described executive 
clemency4 as the "'fail safe' in [the] ... criminaljustice system."5 In 
death-penalty cases that fail safe is essential. Capital punishment is 
being used more often than at any time in recent memory and, 
despite occasional predictions to the contrary,6 there is no decline on 
• Associate, Covington & Burling. My thanks to Ken Haas, Laura Killinger,John Monahan, 
Michelle Morris, and Rip Verkerke for valuable suggestions. All errors and opinions remain my 
own . 
1 Ohio v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 284 (1998) (citation omitted) . 
2 Salatheia Bryant et al. , Gwharn Executed Ajtf!'l St>Uggle, HousroN CHRON.,June 23, 2000, a t 
AI (Star Edition). 
3 Clemency Bewrning Rme A, Executions !n.(.1ense, CORRECI'IONS DICEST,july 8, 1987, at 2. 
4 Throughout this essay I use the term clemency. Clemency is defined as "an official act by 
an executive that removes all or some of the actual or possible punitive consequences of a 
crimina) conviction." KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: jUSfiCE, MERCY AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 4 (1989). Clemency includes pardons , amnesty, reprieves, and commutations. See id. 
at 5. In the death-penalty context we are concerned primarily with the commutation of death 
sentences to life imprisonment. 
5 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,415 (1993). 
6 See Executionf!'l s Swan Song, THE NATION,Jan. 8/ 15, 2001 at 3. 
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the foreseeable horizon.7 At the same time that the use of capital 
punishment has increased, the Supreme Court has "deregulated" the 
death penalty.8 The Court no longer conducts proportionality review 
of death sentences,9 habeas corpus has been scaled back,10 and trial 
courts are not obligated to instruct juries about mitigating 
evidence. 11 Moreover, in the substantive realm, the Court has 
determined that it does not violate the Constitution to execute 
children over age sixteen,l2 or even actually innocent persons.13 
Given the Court's hands-off approach and the more frequent use of 
capital punishment, executive clemency takes on even greater 
importance. In short, clemency truly does have the potential to be 
the fail safe of the criminal justice system.14 Unfortunately, however, 
7 See Kenneth C. Haas, The Ri:.e and Fall of the A-mnica.n Death Penally in the Twenty-Fiut 
Cent·wy, in VISIONS FOR THE FUTURE: CRIME AND jUSTICE IN THE TwEN"IY-FIRST CENTURY (Roslyn 
Muraskin & Albert Roberts eds., 2001). 
8 See gennally Kenneth Williams, The Deteguln.tion of the Death Penalty, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 
677 (2000); Robert Weisberg, Dmguln.tingDeath, 1983 S. CT. REv. 305. 
9 SeePulleyv. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
10 Although Congress and not the Supreme Court is responsible for the 1996Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act, the Supreme Court had begun constricting habeas corpus 
long before that statute was enacted. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolzc Statutes and Real 
Laws: The Patholobri.es of the Antitenmism and EJJe~tive Death Penalty Act and the P,ison Litigation 
Refmm Act, 47 DUKE LJ. 1, 5-12 (1997). 
11 In Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 270 (1998) the Court held that trial courts are not 
obligated to instruct juries about the concept of mitigating evidence (that which suggests the 
death penalty is not deserved) or on particular statutorily defined mitigating factors. But.lwnan 
stands in stark contrast to the Court's earlier sweeping pronouncement that juries, "in all but 
the rarest kind of capital offense," must not be precluded "from considering, as a mitigating 
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 u.s. 586,604 (1978). 
12 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
13 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). The holding in Hmna is subject to debate. 
Some scholars contend that the Henna Court forbade the execution of the innocent. See Barry 
Friedman, FailerlEnletfrtise: 17te Sufnnne Cowl's Habeas Refonn, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 485,509 (1995). 
Other observers are not so optimistic. See Vernon E. Googe III, Herrera v. Collins: Fedna.l 
Habeas Cmpus Remew and ClrtznLf of Ar.tual lmwr.eru.e, 27 GA. L. REv. 971,993 (1993). 
14 All 50 states and the federal system provide for the possrbility of executive clemency. For 
a list of statutes, see Clifford Dome & Kenneth Gewerth, Meny in a Climate uj Rel'tibutwe jtJ.!.li~e: 
!ntetfneta.tions ftorn a National Sumey of Executive Clernen9 Ptor.edwes, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 413,429-30 n.82 (1999). 
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that potential has not been realized. 15 In fact, the use of executive 
clemency has dramatically declined in the last few decades.16 
The decline in executive clemency has been well documented 
(and lamented17) and the explanation for it is quite simple: self-
interest. Governors seeking re-election or other elective office 
l;>elieve that they need to be tough on crime in order to be elected. 1B 
Granting clemency undermines the appearance of toughness and 
therefore governors are very reluctant to risk their political careers by 
granting mercy to convicted murderers. 19 As such, governors deny 
executive clemency and attempt to shift the responsibility elsewhere. 
For instance, as governor of Texas, George W. Bush was frequently 
called upon to grant clemency to death-row inmates. He denied all 
but one of these clemency requests,20 however, and he often 
remarked that clemency was inappropriate because the defendant 
had had full and fair access to the courts. 21 Implicitly, Governor 
Bush seemed to be saying that the blame for any questionable 
executions should lie with the courts and not with the chief executive 
15 See Daniel T. Kobil, 17te Ellollling Rnle of Clr.rrumcy in CafJital GasPs, zn A\!ERICA'S 
EXPERIMENT WITH CAI'ITAL PUNISHMENT 537 Qames R. Acker et al. eds., 1998) (describing 
clemency as a "haphazard fail safe at best"). 
16 Compme WILLIAM j. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 76 n.b (1974) (noting the 
substantial use of executive clemency prior to the 1970s), with Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. 
Zsemb1k, Executwe Clemeru.y in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 289, 304 (1993) 
("The data presented in this Article show that clemency in a capital case is extremely rare."). 
See also Margery M. Koosed, Some Pe1spedwes on the Po~sible Impact of Diminished Fedewl Revie1u of 
Ohio's Death Senle7t.r.es, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 695, 759-63 (1990) (statistically analyzing the decrease 
in commutations). 
17 For the best treatment, see Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Sujneme CoU7t's 
Reliance on Commutation toEmU1e]ustir.e in Death PenalJ.y Crues, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311 (1996). 
18 See Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supunne Cowl's Backwmcls Pwpmtionality jutisjn·udence: 
Compmingjudicial Rroiew of Excessille C>iminal Puni!.hrn.enl.s and Excessive Punitive Damages Awm·cls, 
86 VA. L. REv. 1249, 1300 (2000). 
19 The case of then-Governor Bill Clinton provides a useful example. During his first term 
Governor Clinton commuted a number of death sentences. After losing his bid for re-election 
Clinton again ran for governor, this time promising not to commute so many death sentences 
if he were elected. See Wendell Rawls, Jr., At kansas Gube1natmial Candidates m Close Race, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1982, at B10. 
20 Governor Bush commuted serial killer Henry Lee Lucas' death sentence to life 
imprisonment because of doubt over whether Lucas had committed the actual murder for 
which he had been sentenced to death. Lucas had confessed to 600 murders, including the 
one for which he was sentenced to death, but authorities determined that he could not have 
committed those crimes. Lucas subsequently recanted his confessions. See Bush SpaTes Lucas 
From Death Penalty: G01mnm Commutes Sentence to Life, CilPs Doubts Ol!et Guzlt, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS,June 27, 1998 atAl. 
21 See Bryant et al., supw note 2. 
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of the state that was executing the prisoner. Governors also attempt 
to avoid responsibility for clemency by using state pardon boards as 
political cushions. In some states, governors can claim that they are 
simply following the pardon board's recommendation not to grant 
clemency. In other states, where a pardon board's decision to reject 
a clemency request is binding, governors can maintain that they have 
no choice but to deny clemency. Whether the governors really are 
bound by the boards' recommendations is debatable,22 but it is clear 
that the pardon boards enable the governors to avoid responsibility. 
The governors, however, are not the only ones who have failed to 
ensure the proper use of executive clemency; the courts have also 
shirked their responsibility. The traditional role of courts is to 
ensure that proper procedures are followed. 23 Yet, in the clemency 
context the courts have declined to police the procedural 
guarantees. In Ohio v. Woodan:£24 a divided Supreme Court 
determined that there was either no due process protection or, at 
best, "minimal" due process protection in clemency proceedings. In 
Woodard four justices determined that no abuse of the clemency 
procedure could result in a due process violation,25 while another 
four justices concluded that judicial intervention might be warranted 
if state officials flipped a coin to determine whether clemency should 
be granted.26 The Court concluded that executive clemency is solely 
a "matter of grace committed to the executive,"27 and in doing so 
indicated that it too was unwilling to take responsibility for executive 
clemency. While the Supreme Court is willing to create substantive 
due process guarantees in other areas, such as privacy,28 abortion,29 
and the size of punitive damages awards,30 it is unwilling to ensure 
even procedural guarantees in the clemency arena. 
22 See infta notes 70-79 and accompanying text. 
23 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 0JSTRUSf: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 88 
(1980). 
24 523 u.s. 272 (1998). 
25 See Woodmd, 523 U.S. at 280. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas denied the existence of any due process protection. 
26 See id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor was joined by Justices 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 
27 !d. at 285. 
28 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
29 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
30 SeeBMWv. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
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What is striking about executive clemency is not that both the 
executive and the courts have responsibility but, rather, that neither 
is willing to accept that responsibility. In short, the area of capital 
clemency is the site of a total diffusion of responsibility: The Court 
will not regulate the clemency process because it is a matter for the 
executive and some governors will not grant clemency because the 
execution process belongs entirely to the courts. All the while, the 
use of capital punishment continues to increase, the deregulation of 
the death penalty continues, and the Supreme Court continues to 
proclaim executive clemency as the fail safe of the criminal justice 
system. 
The diffusion of responsibility in capital clemency is dangerous. 
Social science and historical evidence demonstrate that when 
responsibility is diffused, actors will engage in behavior that they 
might otherwise believe to be immoral or unacceptable. An 
innocent defendant wrongly sentenced to death is no doubt 
deserving of clemency. And while most individuals sentenced to 
death clearly are guilty of vile acts, some guilty defendants also may 
be deserving of clemency. Yet, governors who have doubts about 
certain death sentences may not use their authority to grant 
clemency (or use their bully pulpits to encourage pardon boards to 
do so) because they believe responsibility for the execution lies 
elsewhere. Conversely, courts will not step forward to ensure a 
proper clemency system because they believe that the executive 
branch alone is responsible for clemency. Under these 
circumstances the clemency mechanism may fail to halt questionable 
executions. 
Part I of this Essay analyzes the governors' failure to take 
responsibility. It recounts the decline of executive clemency and 
explores governors' "full and fair access to the courts" explanation 
for not granting mercy. Part I then discusses the dangers that are 
created when pardon boards are added to the mix. Part II explains 
the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Woodard in which the Court 
concluded that clemency is a gift of the executive branch and that, as 
a result, capital prisoners are not entitled to due process protection. 
Part III then briefly explores historical and psychological evidence 
about the diffusion of responsibility. Part III uses social science 
literature to demonstrate the dangers inherent in a system where no 
one takes responsibility for capital clemency. Part IV then discusses 
how the Court could have taken responsibility for capital clemency 
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and could have remedied the diffusion of responsibility. Part IV 
argues that procedural due process safeguards at the clemency stage 
can be doctrinally justified and that they are not overly burdensome. 
In imposing procedural safeguards, not only would the Court be 
taking responsibility, but it also would force the final decision-makers 
- governors and pardon boards - to take substantive responsibility 
for capital clemency. 
I: THE GOVERNORS' FAILURE TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITI 
"The Framers granted the pardoning power to the executive alone because they 
believed that, in one set of hands, the pardoning power would be the most 
effective tool for preventing injustice and achieving the goals of the state. '51 
-Professor Kathleen Dean Moore 
From 1959 to 1963, Michael DiSalle, the one-term governor of 
Ohio,32 considered twelve clemency requests by death-row 
prisoners.33 In six cases Governor DiSalle permitted the executions 
to go fonvard, but in six cases, he commuted the sentences to life 
imprisonment.34 More startling than the number of commutations 
Governor DiSalle granted was his practice of personally interviewing 
each death-row inmate requesting clemency at the penitentiary to 
resolve the most questionable cases.35 In 1965 Governor DiSalle 
wrote a book detailing his experience with capital punishment, and 
he began by pointing out that "I believe this is the first book on the 
subject by someone who ... had the final word on whether or not a 
fellow man was to die .... "36 Governor DiSalle's actions differ from 
contemporary accounts in two ways. First, governors do not 
ordinarily drive to the penitentiary to interview death-row inmates. 
Rather, they make decisions based on what others have told them 
about the case. Second, and more disturbing, many of today's 
governors are unwilling even to acknowledge that they have "the 
31 MOORE, sup-ra note 4, at 91. 
32 Governor DiSalle lost his bid for re-election at least in part (and probably largely) 
because of his clemency decisions. See MICHAEL V. DISALLE WITH LAWRENCE G. BLOCHMAN, 
THE POWER OF LIFE OR DEATH 203-04 (1965). 
33 See zd. at 3. 
34 See zd. at 3-5, 27. 
3S See id. at 36, 53, 80. 
36 /d. at 3. 
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final word on whether a fellow man dies." In an unfortunate number 
of contemporary cases, no one in the executive branch is willing to 
take responsibility for executive clemency the way Governor DiSalle 
did. 
A. The Decline in Executive Clemency 
The most obvious evidence of the failure of chief executives to 
take responsibility for executive clemency is the drastic decline in the 
number of commutations. In 1972 the Supreme Court suspended 
the use of the death penalty, finding all then-existing death-penalty 
laws to be unconstitutional because of their arbitrariness.37 Four 
years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,38 the Court concluded that states' 
revised death-penalty laws were less arbitrary, and the Court 
permitted executions to go forward. In the nearly twenty-five years 
between Gregg and January 2001, only forty-four39 death-row inmates 
were granted clemency for humanitarian reasons. 40 This is a marked 
decrease from the number of clemencies granted prior to the 
Court's 1972 moratorium on capital punishment. For instance, from 
1960 to 1971 - only an eleven-year period, as opposed to the twenty-
five years from Gregg to the present - 204 death sentences were 
commuted.41 Before the Supreme Court's moratorium, one out of 
every four or five death sentences was commuted to life 
imprisonment.42 By 1990 that ratio had dwindled to one 
commutation for every forty death-sentences. 43 The post-1976 
decrease in commutations is even more marked when we consider 
that the number of executions is on the rise. While there were 191 
37 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) . 
38 428 u.s. 153 (1976) . 
39 In late 2001 and early 2002, as this Essay was going to press, four additional individuals 
were awarded clemency. See Death Penalty Information Center, Facts About Clemency, 
http:/ /www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency.html (last visited Aug. 31 , 2002). 
40 See id. There have been an additional forty-one clemencies granted for judicial 
expediency purposes. See National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, Fat.ls and Stals, 
http:/ /www.ncadp.org/html/factsandstats.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). Of the forty-four 
humanitarian commutations, eight were granted by Ohio Governor Richard Celeste and five by 
New Mexico Governor Toney Anaya upon leaving their governorships. See Facts About 
Clemency, sutn·a note 39. But for the political statements by these two governors, there would 
have been only thirty-one humanitarian commutations between 1976 and january 2001. 
41 See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemeru:y in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. 
& Soc. CHANGE 255 , 266 (1990-91). 
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
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executions in the 1960's44 and 3 executions in the 1970's,45 there 
were 117 executions in the 1980's46 and 478 in the 1990'sY As the 
number of executions has increased48 the number of commutations 
has drastically decreased. 
What explains this trend? The most optimistic answer would be 
that governors have found fewer legitimate reasons to grant 
clemency in recent years. One hypothesis might be that trials have 
become fairer, or that the mentally retarded and mentally ill are no 
longer convicted of capital offenses. Another might be that racism is 
no longer omnipresent in the criminal justice system or that 
innocent people are no longer wrongly sentenced to death. Most 
death-penalty experts would quickly dispose of these rosy scenarios, 
however. In our modern era, capital defense attorneys still sleep 
through trials,49 the merits of appeals are not considered if they are 
submitted a day too late, 5° and the danger of convicting the innocent 
is as great as ever. 51 
Instead, the decrease in commutations seems to be the result of 
political ambition. Governors secure their reputation of being tough 
on crime (and, by extension, their re-election) by refusing to grant 
clemency. Governors deftly take credit for being tough on crime 
44 See STATISfiCAL ABsTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES: 1999, chart #388. 
45 See id. From 1968 to 1972 no executions were carried out. From the Court's 1972 
decision in Fmman v. Gemgia - striking down all then-existing death penalty statutes- to the 
Court's 1976 decision in Gugg v. Gecnt,:ia - permitting capital punishment to re-commence-
executions were not constitutionally permitted. The first post-Gtegg execution did not take 
place until 1977, and there were only two additional executions during the remainder of the 
1970's. 
46 See Death Penalty Information Center, Additional Execution lr!folmation, http:/ /www.death 
penaltyinfo .org/dpicexec.html (last modified Aug. 28, 2002). 
47 See id. 
48 It is noteworthy, however, that prior to the 1960s there were a substantially larger 
number of executions. In the 1930's there were 1667 executions; there were 1284 in the 1940's 
and 717 in the 1950's. See STATISTICAL AnSTRACf OF THE UNITED STATES: 1999, chart #388. 
Unfortunately data on the number of clemencies prior to the 1960's was not kept. See Elkan 
Abramowitz & David Paget, Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 136, 191 
n.* (1964) (lamenting the lack of data). 
49 See Burdine v.Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (en bane) (explaining how lawyer 
slept through substantial portions of the trial and concluding that it constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
50 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). For a description of the Coleman case, 
see jOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GoD HAVE MERCY: A TRUESTORYOFCRIMEAND PUNISiiMENT (1997). 
51 See Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence: Fteed Ftom Death Row, at http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/Innocentlist.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2002) (cataloging 102 innocent 
prisoners released from death row since 1973). 
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while avoiding any blame for refusing to grant executive clemency. 
They do this in two ways. First, governors explain away their 
decisions not to grant clemency by saying that the prisoner had fair 
access to the courts. Second, governors utilize state pardon boards to 
insulate themselves from responsibility for declining to grant 
clemency. 
B. The ''Full and Fair Access to the Courts" Excuse 
From 1976 until 2000, 683 people were executed in the United 
States of America. The State of Texas carried out 239 of those 
executions. 52 As governor of Texas, George W. Bush presided over 
more than 150 executions and denied all but one request for 
executive clemency.53 In denying these clemency requests, Governor 
Bush said that he had only two criteria: first whether the prisoner was 
innocent and second whether he had full and fair access to the 
courts.54 In no instance did Governor Bush find that a prisoner had 
not had full and fair access to the courts. Despite evidence that 
appointed lawyers had slept through parts of the trial,55 or that they 
were incompetent and only appointed because they were the political 
cronies of the judges sitting in the cases,56 Governor Bush never 
found fault with the judicial process. 
Even more disturbing than Governor Bush's failure to recognize 
that defendants had not received fair access to the courts, is the fact 
that Governor Bush employed the "full and fair access to the courts" 
test in the first place. Defendants are constitutionally entitled to full 
and fair access to the courts. When a prisoner reaches the clemency 
stage of the process -the point at which all direct and collateral 
appeals have been exhausted- there should not even be a question 
whether he has received full and fair access to the courts. To deny 
clemency based on the fact that he has received sufficient access to 
the courts is to view access to the courts as an end in itself. However, 
a prisoner who had full and fair access to the courts could still be 
52 See Death Penalty Information Center, Executions in the U.S. 2000, at http:/ /www.death 
penaltyinfo.org/dpicexecOO.hunl (last visited Aug. 31, 2002). 
53 See supta note 20. 
54 See, e.g., T. Christian Miller, Race Issues Raised in Latest Texas Death Penalty Appea~ LA. 
TIMES, june 29,2000 atA22. 
55 See Paul Duggan, The R.ecmd in Texas: Attamey's Ineptitude Doem 't Hall Exewtions, WAS!·!. 
POST, May 12, 2000 at AI. 
56 See id. 
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morally entitled to clemency. Governor Bush implicitly recognized 
as much by contending that clemency is appropriate when the 
prisoner's innocence has been established. Governor Bush failed, 
however, to consider other situations in which a prisoner might be 
morally entitled to clemency even though he had had full and fair 
access to the courts. For instance, clemency might be appropriate if 
the prisoner has been rehabilitated in prison,57 if the prisoner's co-
defendant received a more lenient sentence, or when mitigating 
circumstances -such as mental retardation- are present. In failing to 
even consider these circumstances Governor Bush shirked his 
responsibility to ensure the possibility of executive clemency. 
Governor Bush instead attempted to foist his responsibility for 
Texas's executions onto the courts.58 
Though Governor Bush is the most prominent exponent of the 
"full and fair access to the courts" excuse he is not the only one. 
Another quite famous attempt to diffuse responsibility for executions 
was offered by then-Governor Bill Clinton. During his first term as 
governor of Arkansas, Clinton commuted a number of death-
sentences. Mter losing his bid for re-election, Clinton ran again and 
this time promised not to commute so many death sentences if 
elected.59 Subsequently he tried to shift responsibility for executions 
to the courts. In refusing to commute a death sentence Clinton said 
57 The obvious citation here is to Karla Fay Tucker, a pick-ax murder who found god while 
in prison and began ministering to other prisoners. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Execution in 
Texas: The Ovemiew; Divisive Case of Kille> of Two Ends as Texas Exe..utes Tw.ker, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 4. 
1998 at AI. Whether Tucker in particular deserved clemency is not so much the issue as 
Governor Bush's refusal to consider tliat a rehabilitated prisoner might be a candidate for 
executive clemency. For an argument that capital sentences of rehabilitated offenders should 
be commuted, see B. Douglas Robbins, Comment, Resunectionfiom a Death Sentence: Why Capital 
Sentences Should Be Commuted Upon the Occasion of an Authentic Ethical Twnsjmmation, 149 U. PA. 
L REv. ll15 (2001). 
58 Governor Bush has also been recently involved in a non-capital diffusion of 
responsibility. A few years ago a man named Achim Marino wrote to Governor Bush and 
admitted to committing a murder for which another man had been wrongly convicted. The 
governor's office did not follow-up on Marino's confession letter and the wrongly-convicted 
man was not released from prison until two years later. A Bush spokesman explained that the 
governor's office did not take any action because Marino's letter said that he had also written a 
letter to Austin police and to the district attorney. Because the letter went to other parties 
Governor Bush's office assumed that someone else would take care of it. Fortunately, someone 
else did determine that the confession was in fact true. However, if the governor's office had 
taken action - rather than assuming that someone else would do it- the innocent man might 
not have languished in prison for another two years. See Paul Duggan, Falsely Accused Texas Man 
Freed Ftom Life Tenn, WASI-l. POST,jan.17, 2001 at A3. 
59 See Rawls, sujna note 19. 
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"[t]he appeals process, although lengthy, 
opportunities for the courts to review sentences 
these [death-penalty] decisions should be made."60 
provides many 
and that's where 
Other governors have used the "full and fair access to the courts" 
excuse without being as blunt as Bush and Clinton. In denying a 
number of clemency petitions, Jim Gilmore, the governor of Virginia, 
has repeatedly remarked "Upon a thorough review of the Petition for 
Clemency, the numerous court decisions regarding this case, and the 
circumstances of this matter, I decline to intervene."61 In Alabama, a 
spokesperson for Governor Guy Hunt explained that "The Governor 
declines to alter the decision of the jury and the courts."62 
When governors are presented with a request for clemency they 
should grant or deny commutation on the merits. The fact that a 
defendant did not have full and fair access to the courts is one reason 
to consider commutation. However the fact that a defendant 
(properly) had full and fair access to the judicial process is not in-
and-of-itself a valid reason to summarily dismiss a clemency request. 
To refuse to consider a clemency request simply because a 
defendant's constitutional rights were not violated amounts to a 
failure by the governor to take responsibility for the defendant's 
execution. 
60 See Clemency Becoming Rme, mpw note 3. More recently, President Clinton avoided 
responsibility for what was to be the federal government's first execution since 1963. One 
month before the end of his term, Clinton ordered a six-month stay of execution for Juan Raul 
Garza, thus leaving Garza's clemency petition to be decided by President-Elect Bush. See 
Edward Walsh, Clinton Stays Kille1 's Execution: Delay Pwmpted /;y Need to Complete Study on 
DisfJmiliPs, WASI-l. POST, Dec. 8, 2000, atA12. 
61 Frank Green, joseph ~xewted fm Slnyzng, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1999, at 81 
(emphasis added). See also George A Quesinberry,Jr., Death Row Inmate Who Killed Businessman 
Du11ng Bolt.hed BUtglmy Is Executed, WASI-l. POST, Mar. 10, 1999, at B5 (same); Frank Green & 
Bob Piazza, Mat.kall Executed fm 1986 Slaying, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 1998, at 81 
(same). 
62 Auwama Executed Man in Death of a Widow, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1989, at A24. In 
disclaiming responsibility, Governor Hunt tried to shift responsibility not just to the courts but 
also to the jury. Interestingly, however, the death sentence had been imposed in spite of the 
jury's recommendation of a life sentence. Governor Hunt thus tried to shift responsibility for 
the execution to an entity that did not even support the execution. See jan Hoffman, Exewlwn 
in Texas: Legal Debate; Seeking Clerneruy in a LauJ7inth that Vmies /;y Stale, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1998, 
at A20. Alabama's practice of permitting judges to impose the death penalty even though the 
jury voted for life imprisonment has been called into question in light of the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Ring v. Atizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). 
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C. How the Pardon Boards Enable Governors to Avoid Responsibility 
Many states have pardon boards that advise governors on whether 
death-sentences should be commuted to life sentences. The 
existence of pardon boards unfortunately creates a diffusion of 
responsibility that permits governors to avoid their clemency duties. 
The diffusion happens as follows: pardon boards recommend that 
clemency not be granted. Governors then deny clemency and point 
to the pardon board's negative recommendation as the reason why 
clemency should be denied. Governors can say that they are merely 
following the recommendation of the pardon board and therefore 
are not responsible for the execution. Quantitative analysis suggests, 
and qualitative analysis confirms, that this diffusion of responsibility 
results in fewer clemencies. 
Quantitative A nalysif>3 
All thirty-eight death-penalty states, as well as the federal 
government, have some type of clemency mechanism. In fourteen 
states the governor has the sole responsibility for granting or denying 
clemency. (In the federal government, the president has the sole 
responsibility for clemency decisions.) 64 As Table 1 indicates, the 
fourteen sole-responsibility states carried out less than 24% of the 
nation's executions between 1976 and 2000, but they constitute more 
than 36% of the forty-four clemencies granted during that time-
period. 
The other twenty-four death-penalty states utilize pardon boards. 
In nine states the pardon board's opposition to clemency is binding 
on the governor; the governor cannot commute a death-sentence 
without the approval of the pardon board.65 If the board 
recommends clemency, the final decision then rests with the 
governor. The number of executions in this category is extremely 
large (and is disproportionate to the number of clemencies), 
primarily due to Texas. 
63 In this section, I utilize data compiled by The Death Penalty Information Center and 
The National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, which is available, respectively, at 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org and www.ncadp.org. 
64 Requests for presidential pardons are vetted by the Department of justice. Though the 
justice Department may make a recommendation to the president, the institution does not 
resemble a pardon board. 
65 However, in these states the governors appoint the members of the board and have 
substantial influence over how the board members vote. See irifm notes 70-79 and 
accompanying text. 
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Table 1: Governor Has Sole Authority to Consider Clemency Request 
State Executions Commutations 
1976-2000 1976-2000 
Alabama 23 1 
California 8 0 
Colorado 1 0 
Kansas 0 0 
Kentucky 2 0 
New Jersey 0 0 
New Mexico 0 5 
New York 0 0 
North Carolina 16 3 
Oregon 2 0 
South Carolina 25 0 
United States (Federal) 0 1 
Virginia 81 6 
Washington 3 0 
Wyoming 1 0 
Total 162 (of 683) 16 (of 44) 
Percentage ofTotal 23.7 36.4 
Table 2: Governor Cannot Grant Clemency Without the 
Recommendation of the Clemency Board 
State Executions Commutations 
1976-2000 1976-2000 
Arizona 22 0 
Delaware 11 0 
Florida 50 6 
Indiana 7 0 
Louisiana 26 1 
Montana 2 1 
Oklahoma 30 0 
Pennsylvania 3 0 
Texas 239 1 
Total 390 (of683) 9 (of 44) 
Percentage ofTotal 57.1 20.5 
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Nine other states also have clemency boards that make 
recommendations. In these states, however, the boards' decisions 
are not binding on the governor. The governor is free to abide by or 
reject the pardon board's positive or negative recommendation. 
Table 3: Clemency Board Makes Non-Binding 
Recommendation to the Govemor 
State Executions Commutations 
1976-2000 1976-2000 
Arkansas 23 1 
Illinois 12 1 
Maryland 3 2 
Mississippi 4 0 
Missouri 46 2 
New Hampshire 0 0 
Ohio 1 8 
South Dakota 0 0 
Tennessee 1 0 
Total 90 (of 683) 14 (of 44) 
Percentage ofTotal 13.1 31.8 
Finally, six states have systems in which the clemency board itself 
makes the final determination whether to grant or deny clemency. 
As Table 5 reflects, in three of these six states the governor sits on the 
clemency board. 
Table 4: Clemency Board Makes Decision Without the Govemor 
State Executions Commutations 
1976-2000 1976-2000 
Connecticut 0 0 
Georgia 23 4 
Idaho 1 1 
Total 24 (of683) 5 (of 44) 
Percentage ofTotal 3.5 11.4 
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Table 5: Govemor Sits on Clemency Board That Makes the Decision 
State Executions Commutations 
1976-2000 1976-2000 
Nebraska 3 0 
Nevada 8 0 
Utah 6 0 
Total 17 (of 683) 0 (of 44) 
Percentage ofTotal 2.5 0 
Obviously, there are enormous political and cultural differences 
among the thirty-eight states that authorize the death penalty. It is 
therefore dangerous to over-generalize by clumping states into 
categories such as pardon-board states or non-pardon board states. 
Nevertheless, these categorizations yield interesting results. The data 
suggest that states in which governors have the sole responsibility for 
clemency decisions have considerably higher rates of commutations 
in comparison to the rates of executions. As Table 6 demonstrates, 
states in which there is a diffusion of responsibility between the 
governor and the pardon boards (adding together binding pardon-
board states and non-binding pardon board states) account for 
70.3% of the executions but only 52.3% of the clemencies. By 
comparison, sole-responsibility states in which the governor is the 
only decision-maker account for only 23.7% of the executions but 
36.4% of the clemencies. 
Table 6: Diffusion of Responsibility 
Type of State Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of 
Executions Total Executions Commutations Total 
1976-2000 1976-2000 Commutations 
Governor is only 162 23.7% 16 36.4% 
decision-maker 
Diffusion of 





Makes Final 41 6.0% 5 11.4% 
Decision 
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The conclusion that larger numbers of clemencies are granted 
when there is no diffusion of responsibility is further amplified when 
we consider the six states in which the clemency board is the sole and 
final decision-maker. In these states there is no diffusion of 
responsibility because the board has the final say on all clemencies. 
As Table 7 demonstrates, adding these states to the governor-only 
states accounts for 29.7% of the executions but 47% of the 
clemencies. By way of comparison, recall that the states in which 
there is a diffusion of responsibility between the governor and the 
pardon board account for 70.3% of the executions but only 52.3% of 
the clemencies. 
Table 7: Diffusion of Responsibility 
Type of State Number of Percentage ofTotal Number of Percentage of 
Executions Executions Commutations Total 
1976-2000 1976-2000 Commutations 





Between 480 70.3% 23 52.3% 
Governor And 
Clemency Board 
This data suggests that clemency is less likely to be granted when 
responsibility for its use is diffused between the governor and the 
pardon board. This conclusion could be challenged however 
because, between 1976 and 2000, Texas was responsible for 35% of 
the executions but only .02% of the clemencies. Texas therefore may 
be an outlier resulting in a false suggestion that the diffusion of 
responsibility between pardon boards and the governor lowers the 
number of clemencies. As Tables 8 and 9 demonstrate, excluding 
Texas shows that there is some merit to this objection. 
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Table 8: Excluding Texas 
685 
Type of State Number of Percentage of Total Number of Percentage of 
Executions Executions Commutations Total 
1976-2000 1976-2000 Commutations 
Governor is only 162 36.5% 16 37.2% 
decision-maker 
Diffusion 




Makes Final 41 9.2% 5 11.4% 
Decision 
Table 9: Excluding Texas 
Type of State Number of Percentage ofTotal Number of Percentage of 
Executions Executions Commutations Total 
1976-2000 1976-2000 Commutations 
Governor Only 




Governor And 241 54.3% 22 51.2% 
ClemencxBoard 
When Texas is excluded, the data suggest that there is no 
substantial difference between states where there is one clemency 
decision-maker and states in which there is a diffusion of 
responsibility between the governor and the pardon boards. As a 
matter of statistics it may be proper to exclude Texas as an outlier. 
However, in an analysis of the death penalty and capital clemency, it 
is inconceivable that Texas - the site of half of the nation's 
executions in some years -should be excluded. Moreover, excluding 
Texas as an outlier, while not controlling for some northern states 
that infrequently utilize the death penalty but still actively exercise 
clemency,66 would be problematic. 
One way to compensate for Texas's large number of executions, 
while still including it in the analysis, is to narrow the sample to the 
so-called "death-belt states," those southern states where most of the 
66 For instance, between 1976 and 2000 only one person was executed in Ohio while eight 
inmates were granted clemency. 
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nation's executions are carried out.67 Between 1976 and 2000, the 
ten death-belt states - Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida, 
Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia 
-accounted for 83% of the nation's executions. In total, these states 
accounted for only 51% of the nation's commutations. 
Table 10: Death Belt States 
Type of State Number of Percentage of Total Number of Percentage of 
Executions Executions in the Commutations Total 
1976-2000 Death Belt 1976-2000 Commutations in 
the Death Belt 
1976-2000 
Governor is 
only decision- 129 (of566) 22.8% 7 31.8% 
maker 
Diffusion 





Board Makes 23 (of 566) 4.1% 4 18.2% 
Final Decision 
More interesting than the low percentage of clemencies in the 
death-belt states is the breakdown between those states in which 
there is a diffusion of responsibility between the governor and the 
pardon board and those states in which there is no diffusion of 
responsibility. As Table 11 demonstrates, states in which either the 
governor or the clemency board is the sole decision-maker account 
for 152 executions and 11 clemencies. States in which responsibility 
is diffused between the governor and the pardon board also account 
for 11 clemencies but 414 executions. Thus, where there is no 
diffusion of responsibility, clemency appears substantially more likely 
to be granted. 
67 See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau , Background and Droewp-rnents, in TilE DEATH PENALlY IN 
AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 21-23 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed ., 1997) (explaining the 
"Death Belt"'). 
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Table 11: Death Belt States 
687 
Type of State Number of Percentage of Number of Percentage of 
Executions Death Belt Commutations Death Belt 
1976-2000 Executions 1976-2000 Commutations 
1976-2000 1976-2000 
Governor Only 




Between 414 (of566) 73.1 11 50.0 
Governor And 
Clemency Board 
The quantitative data do not prove anything definitively. Tables 1 
through 11 do not control for the political culture of individual 
states, the use of commutation as a political statement, or the 
circumstances of the particular cases in which clemency was or was 
not granted. Nevertheless, the numbers are still instructive. The 
data provide a jumping-off point for the claim that commutations are 
much less likely when there is a diffusion of responsibility between 
the governor and a clemency board. As the subsequent sections will 
demonstrate, qualitative analysis buttresses this conclusion. 
Qualitative Analysis 
1. Governor Only 
In fourteen states, the governor must assess each clemency 
petition by himself. The upside of this system is that there is no 
diffusion of responsibility. When it comes time to deny or grant 
clemency, the governor cannot say his hands are tied or that the 
decision falls to another body in the executive branch.68 The 
downside of this system, of course, is that because sole responsibility 
lies with the governor, so does the potential political fall-out that may 
accompany a grant of clemency. Thus, a sole-responsibility system 
has the virtue of forcing the governor to take responsibility for 
denying clemency but at the same time includes the risk that a 
governor concerned with being tough-on-crime will carry out that 
responsibility by denying all clemency requests. 
68 Of course, the governor can still use the full and fair access to the courts excuse and try 
to place the responsibility with the courts alone. 
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2. Involving a Pardon Board 
a. Governor A voids Responsibility 
In many states, the existence of pardon boards permits governors 
to avoid responsibility for executions by claiming that they are just 
following the pardon boards. For example, imagine that a death-row 
inmate petitions the Arkansas Pardon Board for commutation of his 
death sentence. Imagine also that the prisoner, although guilty, is 
not as culpable for the crime as his co-conspirator who received a life 
sentence. The pardon board recommends against commuting the 
death sentence. The governor of Arkansas, although not required to 
do so, abides by this recommendation and permits the execution to 
go forward. When death-penalty opponents protest the execution, 
the governor can hide behind the pardon board and say that he is 
just following their informed recommendation. This excuse may 
even serve to eliminate any of the governor's personal qualms when 
he tries to sleep at night. 69 Though the governor might have had 
some doubts about whether a mentally retarded prisoner was 
sufficiently culpable to deserve execution, the governor may be able 
to convince himself that he is not responsible for the execution. 
After all, the pardon board recommended against commutation, and 
either the board was correct to do so or, if it was incorrect, the blame 
should fall on the board members and not the governor. Thus, 
although the Arkansas governor is responsible for the execution, in 
the course of declining clemency he may be able to convince the 
public and himself that the responsibility lies with the pardon board. 
Governors can abdicate their responsibility for executions even 
more effectively when given the cloak of law. In other words, it is 
easier for governors to deny responsibility for executions in the nine 
states that prevent the governor from granting clemency unless the 
pardon board has first recommended mercy. In these states the 
governor is able to say not only that he should defer to the pardon 
board's decision but that, by law, he must defer to its decision. 
The legal constraint on governors to follow the recommendations 
of the pardon board is only nominal however. Although on paper 
the governor must abide by the pardon board's decision, in reality it 
69 Cf ROBERT M. COVER, jUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE jUDICIAL PROCESS 235 
(1975) ("[Discomfort] will be reduced insofar as [the individual] can view himself as a 
mechanical instrument of the will of others."). 
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is the pardon board members who must follow the dictates set down 
by the governor. In the nine "binding" states, the governors appoint 
the members of the pardon boards.70 Appointment to the pardon 
board is a form of political patronage, and it can be expected that 
loyalty to the governor is part of the unspoken price for a political 
appointment. In turn, board members will be under pressure to 
follow the governor's wishes. This form of political pressure can be 
more extreme when the threat of removal exists. 71 In a number of 
states, the members of the pardon board must do what the governor 
wants or face losing their seats on the pardon boards. The case of 
Tim Baldwin provides an extreme example. 
Baldwin appealed to the Louisiana Board of Pardons and Paroles 
to have his death sentence commuted. (Louisiana is one of the nine 
states in which the governor cannot grant clemency unless the 
pardon board recommends it.) Mter hearing new evidence of 
Baldwin's innocence, the chairman of the Pardon Board, Howard 
Marsellus, concluded that "I just couldn't convince myself that the 
man was really guilty and deserved to die .... "72 Marsellus, however, 
knew that he was supposed to be a team player and that he was 
supposed to keep clemency cases from ever getting to the governor's 
desk. 73 In Baldwin's case Marsellus really believed that mercy was 
warranted, and he called the governor's chief legal counsel to 
explain why he wanted to recommend granting clemency.74 The 
governor's counsel responded that "the governor [does] not like to 
be confronted with these cases and . . . [Marsellus should] handle 
it."75 In no uncertain terms, Marsellus was then told "[i]f you can't 
hack it, we'll just have to replace you with someone who can."76 This 
70 See 61 ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 31-401 (2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4341 (2000); FLA. 
STAT. § 947.02 (2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-9-1-1 (2000); LA. REv. STAT. 15:572.1 (2000); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-2302 (2000); OKL. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (1999) (three of the five 
members appointed by the Governor); PA. STAT. ANN. 331.2 (2000) (with the advice and 
consent of the Senate); Tex Gov't Code§ 508.036 (1999). 
71 In a number of states, governors have the power to remove members of the pardon 
boards. See 61 ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 31-401 (2000) (removal for cause); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
4341 (2000) (removal for any reason); IND. CODE ANN.§ 11-9-1-1 (2000) (removal for cause); 
LA. REv. STAT. 15:572.1 (2000) (replaced for any reason); OKL. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (1999) 
(removal for cause); PA. STAT. ANN. 331.2 (2000) (removal for any reason). 
72 SISTER HELEN PRFJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING 170-71 (1993). 
73 See id. at 171. 
74 See id. 
75 Jd. 
76 Jd. 
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hardly paints a picture of a governor who is constrained by the 
pardon board. Instead, it was the governor who actually denied 
clemency while using the pardon board as a political cushion to 
avoid responsibility. 
A less egregious example is the case of Gary Graham. Graham 
claimed to be innocent, and his cause attracted the attention of 
celebrities and civil rights leaders. Mter the Texas Board of Pardons 
and Paroles denied clemency, Jesse Jackson castigated Governor 
Bush. Jackson stated that the 18 members of the board owe their 
$80,000-a-year jobs to the governor and that a "nod" from Bush to 
the Board could have resulted in a vote for clemency.77 At the time, 
Bush was campaigning for the presidency and touting his record of 
being able to work with Democrats and other diverse groups to 
reform education and solve problems.78 Yet, while Bush proclaimed 
his ability to work with opponents to get things done, he denied that 
he had any influence over the pardon board members whom he had 
appointed.79 The idea that Bush had been able to persuade 
Democrats to support his legislation but that he was unable simply to 
suggest to his pardon board appointees that clemency might be 
appropriate is untenable. 
In sum, to suggest that the governor is bound by the pardon 
board's recommendation is technically true, but only nominally so. 
In actuality, governors have the real power, and the pardon boards 
serve as political cushions. In this way, governors are able to pass the 
buck to the pardon board while creating the appearance that they 
are helpless to do anything about it. 
b. Pardon Boards Refuse to Accept Responsibility 
As we have seen, governors can successfully avoid their clemency 
responsibility by passing it to the pardon boards. The pardon 
boards, however, do not shoulder the responsibility for the 
executions either. As Howard Marsellus, former chairman of the 
Louisiana Board of Pardons, said in rejecting a clemency petition, 
77 See Paul Duggan, Texas Executes Gtaham After Appeals Fail: Death Penalty Case Dogs Bush in 
His Bid for Presiderny, WASH. POST,june 23, 2000, at Al. 
78 See Richard L. Berke, Bush in Address Will Make Appeal Beyond the G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, july 
30, 2000, at A6. (quoting Bush only one month after Graham's execution as saying "[o]ne of 
the things that people don't really know about me is that I've been good about bringing people 
together to get things accomplished in Texas"). 
79 See Duggan, supm note 77. 
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"the members of the Board . .. [are) not personally responsible for 
this man, or any man, dying in the electric chair."8° Currently, Texas 
provides the best (and the most prolific) example of a pardon board 
refusing to take responsibility. 
The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles has recommended 
clemency only once in the past seventeen years. 81 Despite the fact 
that the board has the power to decide who lives and dies, it has no 
criteria for making such a decision and board members receive little 
formal training.82 There is even evidence to suggest that board 
members do not read the information presented to them.83 Some 
members check only to see whether the prisoner was convicted of a 
horrible crime and whether he received appellate review. 84 
Additionally, letters from the public opposing the executions 
(sometimes numbering in the thousands) are not delivered to the 
board members.85 The eighteen members of the board make their 
decisions to deny clemency without ever meeting together to discuss 
the case.86 This in itself is yet another form of the diffusion of 
responsibility and it of course means that the condemned prisoner 
never gets an opportunity to make his case before the board that is 
deciding his fate . Finally, in the ultimate failure to take 
responsibility, the board members do not even give a reason for 
denying clemency.87 These facts taken together paint a picture of a 
80 See PREJEAN, sufna note 72, at 169. 
81 See Amnesty International Report AMR 51/085/1999, United Stales of Amaiw: Kilii11g 
Without Meu.y: Clernent.y Pwcedwes in Texas, at http:/ /www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ 
AMR510851999 Uan. 6, 1999). 
82 See id. at 3. 
83 See id. at 8. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. at 7. 
86 See id. at 3. In 1991, at Governor Ann Richards' request, the pardon board, for the only 
time in its history, met together to consider a clemency request. The board denied clemency. 
According to Amnesty International, the Texas board refused to convene clemency hearings 
for Terry Washington, who had an IQ of 58, id. at n.13; Robert Drew, who had been convicted 
even though someone else had confessed to the crime; and Jesse Jacobs, who was convicted 
even though the prosecution later conceded that he may have had no direct involvement in the 
crime. See id. at 4. 
87 Various challenges to the Texas clemency system consistently have been rejected. Most 
recently, see Foulder v. Texas, 178 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999) . In upholding the system a district 
judge nevertheless found that "[A]dministratively the goal is more to protect the secrecy and 
autonomy of the system rather than carrying out an efficient legally sound system. The board 
would not have to sacrifice its conservative ideology to carry out its duties in a more fair and 
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group of decision-makers unwilling to take responsibility for the final 
decision of whether someone lives or dies. 
The members of pardon boards remain obscure figures. They do 
not have to publicly take responsibility for their decisions. Instead 
the governor of Texas, in the course of announcing the Board's 
decision, becomes the public face of the Board members. Yet, while 
assuming the board's public face, the governor is able to disclaim 
responsibility for the Board's actions. Realizing the problems with 
this situation, a state senator, Rodney Ellis, introduced a bill that 
would have required the pardon board to hold a public hearing in 
death-penalty cases in which the prisoner requested commutation.88 
Ellis remarked, "Maybe we ought to join the other states that give the 
governor clear, final authority whether or not to execute someone."89 
Governor Bush opposed the bill and it died quickly, thus preserving a 
system in which neither the pardon board nor the governor is 
ultimately responsible for denying clemency. 
Clearly, Texas and Louisiana provide egregious examples of the 
failures of the clemency process. Nevertheless, the fact remains that 
even in more progressive states, there is a diffusion of responsibility 
between the governors and the pardon boards. Governors can avoid 
taking responsibility for the clemency process by pointing to the 
pardon boards. In turn, the pardon boards fail to take responsibility 
for their ultimate decisions. 
* * * 
In summary, governors have the opportunity to, and in fact do, 
avoid responsibility for executive clemency. First, governors are able 
to deny clemency because the defendant had full and fair access to 
the courts. As we have seen, this is merely an excuse to avoid 
conducting an inquiry into whether the petitioner is morally entitled 
to clemency. Governors are also able to deny their clemency 
responsibilities by pointing to the pardon board's recommendation 
that clemency be denied. This shifting of responsibility is 
unacceptable, however, because the pardon boards fail to take the 
accurate fashion." Sara Rimer & Jim Yardley, Pending Execution in Texas Spotlights a Powf!ljul 
Bomd, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2000, atAl. 
88 Sf.e John Moritz, C1iticism Intensifying on "Ser.ut" Clernrmr.y Reuiew, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, June 24, 2000, at 23. 
89 !d. (emphasis added). 
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responsibility that is passed to them. Additionally, shifting 
responsibility from the governor to the pardon board is a game of 
hide-the-ball because in many cases, the governor has control over 
the pardon board. 
II: THE COURT'S FAILURE TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITI 
In Ohio v. Woodard, 90 a fractured Supreme Court considered 
whether clemency petitioners retain a due process interest in 
clemency procedures until they are executed. Eugene Woodard was 
sentenced to death in Ohio, and his sentence was affirmed on 
appeal.91 Woodard claimed that Ohio's clemency procedures 
deprived him of due process because he did not have a sufficient 
opportunity to prepare for the clemency interview and hearing 
because he was given only a few days notice to prepare. 92 
Additionally, Woodard alleged a due process violation because his 
counsel was not permitted to participate at the clemency hearing and 
because Woodard himself was precluded from testifying or 
submitting documentary evidence at the hearing.93 Eight justices 
rejected Woodard's claim but, as in many other Rehnquist Court 
decisions, there was no majority opinion. Speaking for Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged 
that a clemency petitioner has a "residual life interest ... in not 
being summarily executed by prison guards. "94 According to the 
Chief Justice, that is where the due process protection ends, however. 
The Chief Justice contended that a death-row inmate's petition for 
clemency is a "unilateral hope" and a matter of grace granted by the 
chief executive.95 As such, the Governor's discretion to grant or deny 
90 523 u.s. 272 (1998). 
91 See id. at 277. 
92 See id. at 289 (O'Connor,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
93 See id. at 289-90 (O'Connor,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
94 See id. at 281. 
95 /d. at 282. There is support for this conclusion. In 1833, Chief Justice Marshall opined 
that a pardon is "an act of grace." United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833). 
There is also contradictory precedent however. In 1927 Justice Holmes explained that "[a] 
pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. 
It is a part of the constitutional scheme." Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927). See also 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens) (explaining that a capital punishment system that did not provide for executive 
clemency would be "totally alien to our notions of criminal justice.") Additionally, Kathleen 
Dean Moore, the leading scholar on this subject, takes the position that pardons are not an act 
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clemency need not be burdened by procedural protections.96 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist rejected Woodard's contention that because 
executive clemency has been historically available, it constitutes an 
integral part of the system of adjudicating guilt or innocence and 
therefore merits due process protections.97 Instead, the ChiefJustice 
concluded that 
[C]lemency proceedings are not part of the trial-or 
even of the adjudicatory process. They do not 
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant, 
and are not intended primarily to enhance the 
reliability of the trial process .... 
If clemency is granted, [the inmate] obtains a 
benefit; if it is denied, he is no worse off than he was 
before.98 
The Chief Justice's conclusion that no due process protection 
attaches to clemency proceedings is quite alarming given his opinion 
five years earlier in Herrera v. Collins. 99 In Herrera, a fractured Court 
held that habeas corpus was not available for free-standing claims of 
actual innocence.100 In denying habeas protection, the ChiefJustice 
remarked that executive clemency is the "'fail safe' in [the] ... 
criminal justice system."101 In Woodard however, the Chief Justice 
seems to deny that clemency is even part of the criminal justice 
system, suggesting instead that it is merely a gift that a governor can 
choose to offer. Moreover, because no due process protection 
attaches to the "fail safe" of the criminal justice system there would 
of grace. See MOORE, sufna note 4, at 91 ("[W]hatever may have been true of the great 
monarchies, in the American democracy the pardon is not a gift from the sovereign."). 
96 See Woodanl, 523 U.S. at 282. 
97 See id. at 283. 
98 /d. at 284-85. The logic underlying the Chief justice's final statement is disturbing. The 
"no worse off' idea could easily be applied to other aspects of the criminal justice system. For 
instance, why should there be due process protection in direct or collateral appeals if the 
convicted defendant would be "no worse off' in the event that those appeals are denied? 
99 506 u.s. 390 (1993). 
IOO /·!mel a has sparked considerable outcry. For the best analysis of the decision see Vivian 
Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway oflr~no!.ence Fm Dealh-Senleru.ed P.1isone1s Leads Nowhne, 
35 WM. & MARYL. REV. 943 (1994). 
101 See Henna, 506 U.S. at 115. 
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be no constitutional violation if the governor denied 
flipping a coin or because he had received a bribe. 
leaves clemency as a fail safe. 
clemency by 
This hardly 
The other Woodard plurality was not much more generous. Justice 
O'Connor, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
concluded that "some minimal procedural safeguards apply to 
clemency proceedings."102 According to Justice O'Connor, judicial 
intervention might be warranted if "a state official flipped a coin to 
determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the State 
arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process." 103 
However, Justice O'Connor saw no due process problems with the 
Ohio clemency system. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause did not require that Woodard be given more than a few days 
notice of the clemency hearing. 104 Additionally, due process did not 
mandate that Woodard's lawyer be permitted to participate or that 
Woodard himself be permitted to testify or to submit evidence. 105 
While Justice O'Connor deserves credit for recognizing that at 
least some due process protection must attach to clemency systems, 
her conclusion that only minimal due process protection is required 
is problematic. Like Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor has 
also recognized that executive clemency is the fail safe of the 
criminal justice system. 106 Clemency can hardly act as a fail safe, 
however, if the death-row inmate is not permitted to testify or to 
present evidence at the clemency hearing. Moreover, if the inmate is 
permitted to testify but is illiterate or inarticulate he may not be able 
adequately to present his case for clemency without the assistance of 
a lawyer. Finally, even if the inmate is permitted to testify and to 
introduce evidence with the assistance of a lawyer, he might not be 
able convincingly to do so without adequate notice of the clemency 
hearing. 
The lack of constitutionally-mandated due process protection for 
clemency systems is problematic because many states decline to offer 
102 See Woodmd, 523 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor,]., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (emphasis in original). 
103 !d. (O'Connor,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
104 See id. at 289-90 (O'Connor,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
105 See id. (O'Connor,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
106 See Hene.a, 506 U.S. at 427 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
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those guarantees voluntarily. 107 Only eight death-penalty states 
statutorily permit or require the clemency applicant's presence. 108 
Only nine death-penalty states govern clemency proceedings with 
formal rules of evidence,109 and only a handful of state statutes list 
specific due process guarantees.l1° Without due process guarantees, 
clemency can hardly be a fail safe against improper execution.l1 1 
III. THE DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILI1Yll2 
The Supreme Court has recognized the dangers of the diffusion 
of responsibility. In Caldwell v. Mississippi, ll3 the Court held that a 
prosecutor may not minimize a jury's sense of personal moral 
responsibility when determining whether to impose the death 
penalty. Specifically, the Court held that a prosecutor could not tell 
the jury that its decision to impose the death penalty was 
107 For a survey of variations in state clemency procedures (from which I borrow the 
citations for the subsequent footnotes), see Dorne and Gewerth, sufna note 14. 
108 See ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN.§ 31-411B (West 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §18-29 (West 
1998); 730 ILL. COM!'. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-13 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-9-2-2 (Michie 
1998); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 572.4 (West 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-1 111 (Michie 
1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 299 (West Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 77-27-7 (1998). 
109 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §18-30 (West 1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4361 (1998); 
FLA STAT. ch. 940.03 (1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-9-l-2 (Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 572.4 (West 1998); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 83-1, 111 (Michie 1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, 
331.19 (West 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAws§ 24-13-7 (Michie 1998); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 77-27-7 
(1998). 
110 See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 31-411B (West 1998); GA. CODE ANN. §42-9-50 (1997); 730 
ILL. COM!'. STAT. Al'IN. 5/3-3-13 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN.§ 11-9-2-2 (Michie 1998); MONT. 
CODEAI'IN. § 46-23-306 (1997). 
ll1 Only Justice Stevens refused to conclude that Ohio's clemency system satisfied due 
process. Justice Stevens recognized that "if a State adopts a clemency procedure as an integral 
part of its system for finally determining whether to deprive a person of life, that procedure 
must comport with the Due Process Clause." Woodmd, 523 U.S. at 292 (Stevens,]., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens would have remanded the case to the district 
court to determine whether Ohio's clemency procedures meet the minimum due process 
requirements. See id. at 295 (Stevens,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
112 Some scholars draw a distinction between the diffusion of responsibility and the 
dissolution of responsibility. In the former, responsibility is accepted but shared. In the latter, 
"responsibility is dissolved by rationalizing that someone else has already helped." JANE ALLYN 
PILIAVIN ET AL., EMERGENCY INTERVENTION 121 (1981). Under the more nuanced terminology, 
capital clemency amounts to a dissolution of responsibility because the governors, pardon 
boards, and courts are assuming that someone else will take care of it. However, because most 
of the literature does not differentiate between diffusion and dissolution, I will simply utilize 
the more broadly-used "diffusion of responsibility" terminology. 
113 472 u.s. 320 (1985). 
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automatically reviewable by an appellate court. 114 The Court feared 
that if the jury did not see itself as the responsible agent it might be 
more willing to mete out a death-sentence. 115 In other words, jurors 
would be more willing to impose a questionable death sentence 
because of their belief that someone else would correct the error on 
appeal. The Court explained that in capital cases the jury has a "truly 
awesome responsibility" and it is unacceptable for the prosecutor "to 
minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the 
appropriateness of death." 116 The Caldwell decision thus identified 
the problem of the diffusion of responsibility and sought to prevent 
it. 
Several years after Caldwell, and in an entirely different doctrinal 
area, the Court again expressed concern about the diffusion of 
responsibility. In New York v. United States, 117 the Court struck down a 
federal radioactive waste act which required states either to adopt a 
federally-approved method of disposing of radioactive waste or to 
take title and liability to all radioactive waste produced in the state. 
In effect, the statute amounted to federal legislators commandeering 
state resources to carry out federal policies. The Court expressed 
concern that the commandeering might make it difficult for the 
public at large to know whether to blame federal or state officials for 
the program. In other words, the Court found the commandeering 
unacceptable, in part, because it would result in a diffusion of 
political responsibility between federal and state legislators. 118 
A. Historical and Social Science Evidence 
The Supreme Court's concern in Caldwell and in New York about 
the dangers of the diffusion of responsibility is supported by both 
historical evidence and social science data. 
Perhaps the best historical example of the diffusion of 
responsibility is the infamous story of Kitty Genovese. Kitty Genovese 
was attacked and killed outside of a New York City apartment 
building in 1964. 119 Her assailants had three chances to attack her 
114 See id. at 325-26. 
115 See id. at 330-32. 
llG /d. at 341. 
117 505 u.s. 144 (1992) 
llS Seeid. at 168-69. 
119 See A.M. ROSENTHAL, THIR1Y-EIGHTWITNESSES 32-36 (1964). 
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during a thirty-five minute period. Despite Ms. Genovese's screams 
for help, not one of the thirty-eight witnesses inside the apartment 
building called for assistance during the thirty-five minutes. 120 The 
failure of witnesses to help Kitty Genovese was originally attributed to 
apathy.121 Some said they did not want to get involved, and others 
replied "I don't know" when asked why they did not call for help. 122 
While apathy may have had something to do with it, a better 
explanation is the diffusion of responsibility. 123 From inside their 
apartments, the witnesses were insulated from responsibility for Kitty 
Genovese. Moreover, it was clear to each witness that multiple 
people heard her cries for help. Rather than doing something, each 
witness was able to assume that someone else had called for help. 
Had there been only one witness, and had that witness known that he 
alone was in a position to help, he would have been more likely to 
aid Kitty Genovese. 
Experimental psychology confirmed the dangers of the diffusion 
of responsibility. 124 In the late-1960s Stanley Milgram designed a 
series of experiments to test subjects' obedience to authority. 125 
Subjects were instructed by a confederate - a legitimate authority 
figure- to give electric shocks to a "victim" who they could not see. 126 
The confederate ordered the subject to give increasingly larger, 
potentially fatal, shocks to the "victim." Though many of the subjects 
had reservations, they nevertheless followed orders and administered 
the shock. (The victim acted as though he had been shocked, 
sometimes crying out in pain and begging for the subject to stop, 
though in actuality, and unbeknownst to the subject, the victim had 
not been shocked.) Milgram then found that when the subjects were 
brought face-to-face with their victims, the subjects were less willing 
120 See id. 
121 See id. at 82. 
122 ld. at 79. 
123 See John M. Darley & Bibb Latane, Bystander lnteiVention ir1 Erfle'lgem.ies: Diffusion of 
Responsibility, 8 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 377 ( 1968) (finding that mere perception that 
others are witnessing the event markedly decreases the likelihood of intervention) . 
124 Well over 50 experimental studies have explored the concept of the diffusion of 
responsibility. See Bibb Latane & Steve Nilda, Ten Yea1S of Reseatch on G10up Size and Helping, 89 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 308 (1981) (reviewing the literature). See also PILIAVIN ET AL., supw note ll2, 
at 120-32 (discussing some of the literature) . These studies have found that when responsibility 
is diffused people engage in or fail to stop immoral or anti-social behavior. 
125 See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTI-IORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974) . 
126 See id. at ch. 1. 
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to shock the victims. 127 As Professor Craig Haney has put it, when 
"people ... are forced to 'get involved' and feel responsible for the 
safety and well-being of others ... [they] are more likely to behave in 
a socially responsible rather than blindly obedient manner. "128 
Milgram himself explained that "it is psychologically easy to ignore 
responsibility when one is only an immediate link in a chain of evil 
action but is far from the final consequences of the action."l29 
Milgram's conclusions are consistent with accounts of the 
Holocaust. 130 In Eichmann in jerusalem, Hannah Arendt argues that 
Adolph Eichman was not a monster but rather a "terribly and 
terrifyingly normal" bureaucrat. 131 As Milgram explains it, 
Even Eichmann was sickened when he toured the 
concentration camps, but to participate in mass 
murder he had only to sit at a desk and shuffle papers. 
At the same time the man in the camp who actually 
dropped Cyclon-B into the gas chambers was able to 
justify his behavior on the grounds that he was only 
following orders from above. Thus there is a 
fragmentation of the total human act; no man decides 
to carry out the evil act and is confronted with its 
consequences. The person who assumes full 
responsibility for the act has evaporated. Perhaps this 
is the most common characteristic of socially 
organized evil in modern society.l32 
By utilizing these examples I do not intend to compare the United 
States courts, governors, and pardon boards to Eichmann and Nazi 
Germany. Likewise, death-sentenced inmates are not (except in 
cases of actual innocence) victims in the same way that Kitty 
127 See id. at ch. 4. 
128 Craig Haney, Vwleru.e a·fld lite Capila.l Jwy: Medw.m.:.ms of Mowl D~>tm.gagCTT~enl and lite 
lmfJUlselo Condemnlo Deallt, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1447, 14 74 (1997). 
129 MILGRAM, supw note 125, at 11. 
130 See DANIEL C0LDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS 11-12 (1996) (recounting 
the conventional explanations of the Holocaust). In concluding that Germans were motivated 
by anti-Semitism and that they did not want to stop the Holocaust, Goldhagen rejects Stanley 
Milgram's research about obedience to authority. See id. at 12 n.26, 383. 
131 HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN jERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALin' OF EVIL 276 
(1963) . 
132 MILGRAM, supm note 125, at I l. 
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Genovese was. Nevertheless, the principles extrapolated from 
Milgram, Arendt, and the case of Kitty Genovese are instructive. 
When the sense of personal responsibility is diffused among multiple 
parties, the danger exists that no one will take responsibility. Party A 
may not stop an immoral practice because she believes that it is party 
B's responsibility to deal with it. Similarly, party B will not stop the 
immoral practice because he believes that party A is responsible for 
it. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Caldwell v. Mississippi and New 
York v. United States suggests that this type of situation is 
unacceptable . And, the Kitty Genovese case and the experimental 
data compiled by Stanley Milgram and other social scientists 
demonstrate that the Court was correct to be concerned about the 
diffusion of responsibility. 
B. The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital Clemency 
Unfortunately, in the area of capital clemency the Supreme Court 
and a number of governors have ignored the story of Kitty Genovese 
and the experiments of Stanley Milgram and other social scientists. 
There is a vast diffusion of responsibility in capital clemency. In 
Woodard, the Court concluded that clemency is solely a matter for the 
executive branch. The Court refused to take responsibility and to 
impose procedural safeguards because it believed that someone else 
- the executive -was responsible. The executive branch has failed to 
take responsibility as well however. Governors have disclaimed 
responsibility for executions (and denied clemency) because the 
inmate had full and fair access to the courts. Essentially, governors 
have disclaimed responsibility because they think the courts are 
responsible for the execution. The situation is further complicated 
by the diffusion of responsibility between governors and pardon 
boards. Governors deny clemency because of recommendations 
from the pardon board; accordingly governors are not responsible 
because they are following the pardon boards' recommendations. At 
the same time, the individual members of the pardon board can 
believe that they are not responsible either. In some states the 
pardon board merely offers a recommendation, and therefore board 
members can have the mind-set that it is the governor who is 
responsible. Board members who are the final decision-makers can 
also avoid feeling responsible by shifting responsibility to the courts. 
As noted, some members of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles 
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vote to deny clemency after checking to make sure that courts 
conducted appellate review of the prisoner's death sentence. 133 
Stanley Milgram's observation about proximity to the victim 
should give us even more pause. Milgram found that the subject was 
less likely to shock the victim when the subject and victim were face-
to-face. This suggests that participants in the clemency process 
would be less likely to shirk their duty if they were face to face with 
the petitioner. Yet governors rarely meet face-to-face with clemency 
petitioners. Even the members of the Texas Board of Pardons and 
Paroles - who, in some years, consider half of the nation's capital 
clemency petitions - do not meet face-to-face with clemency 
petitioners (or even face-to-face with other members of the pardon 
board for that matter). 
In short, there is a diffusion of responsibility in the area of capital 
clemency. This of course does not necessarily mean that any 
meaningful clemency petitions have been denied (though 
compelling arguments can be made. 134) At minimum, however, the 
situation is ripe for error. With the courts, the governors, and the 
pardon boards in a position to avoid responsibility for the execution 
and the clemency process, it is dangerously possible that a 
questionable execution could occur. 
IV. ELIMINATING THE DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILI1Y 
In Woodard, Chiefjustice Rehnquist's plurality opinion concluded 
first that a clemency petitioner did not have a life interest in the 
clemency proceeding and second that, as a result, the petitioner was 
not entitled to due process protection. Compelling arguments can 
be made that both conclusions are incorrect. Death-row inmates 
have life interests in clemency hearings and they are entitled notjust 
to minimal due process protection (as Justice O'Connor concluded) 
but, rather, regular due process protection. In determining which 
procedural safeguards due process requires, the Court can ensure 
that the final decision-makers in the executive branch take 
responsibility for capital clemency. Thus, as the Court takes 
133 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
134 Gary Graham , who was executed in Texas in June, 2000, provides the best recent 
example. See Bruce Nichols, Cties of lujustiu Gtow in '81 Graham Muuler Case, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, june 13, 2000, at AlO. See alloTUCKER, sujna note 50 (discussing the possible innocence 
of Roger Keith Coleman, who was executed in Virginia in 1992). 
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responsibility for capital clemency procedures, it can also force the 
executive branch to take responsibility for the substantive clemency 
decision. 
A. There Is a Life Interest in Capital Clemency 
The Rehnquist plurality in Woodard concluded that there was no 
life interest in capital clemency, but the O'Connor plurality 
disagreed. The logic underlying three previous cases supports the 
existence of a life interest. 
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 135 the Supreme Court held that due process 
protections apply to revocations of parole. Typically, a paroled 
inmate is entitled to retain his liberty so long as he abides by the 
conditions of his parole. 136 In Brewer the Court concluded that 
because a parolee retains many of the core values of unqualified 
liberty, the termination of parole would be a "grievous loss. "137 As 
such, due process protections attach to the revocation of parole. 138 
Seven years later the Court rejected the idea that an inmate seeking 
parole had a liberty interest in a parole hearing. In Greenholtz v. 
Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex139 the Court 
explained that when a person has been fairly convicted and 
sentenced, his liberty interest in being free from confinement is 
extinguished. 140 In Brewer and Greenholtz the Supreme Court 
construed a liberty interest as whether the inmate had something 
tangible to lose. A fairly-convicted prisoner has no liberty interest in 
being granted parole because he has been rightly jailed and loses no 
entitled freedom when parole is denied. Conversely, a paroled 
inmate does have a liberty interest in revocation of his parole 
because revocation would take away the freedom he had been 
granted. Armed with this logic the Court concluded in Connecticut 
Board of Pardons v. Dumschat141 that a convicted felon does not have a 
liberty interest in executive clemency. The Court explained that the 
decision to commute a long prison sentence is similar to the decision 
to grant parole. 142 A felon has no expectation that his long sentence 
135 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
136 Seeid. at479. 
137 !d. at 482. 
138 See id. 
139 442 U.S. 1 (1979). 
140 See id. at 7. 
141 452 U.S. 458 (1981). 
142 See id. at 464. 
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might be commuted, and therefore when clemency is denied, he has 
not lost anything.143 
In Woodard the Rehnquist plurality relied heavily on Dumschat in 
concluding that due process protection does not attach to capital 
clemency proceedings. 144 Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that 
"(t]he reasoning of Dumschat did not depend on the fact that it was 
not a capital case."145 The Chief Justice missed the key point 
however. The Dumschat clemency hearing involved a "liberty 
interest," whereas the Woodard clemency hearing involved a "life 
interest." When Dumschat was denied clemency, he did not lose his 
liberty because he was already imprisoned; when Woodard was 
denied clemency he lost his life (something he still possessed at the 
time of the hearing). Simply because Woodard was sentenced to 
death does not mean that Dumschat is not controlling. In fact, 
Dumschat, Brewer, and Greenholtz are directly controlling. Those three 
cases stand for the proposition that due process protection attaches 
when the petitioner stands to lose something tangible, what the 
Court has called a "grievous loss."146 The question then is whether 
Woodard stood to lose something tangible if denied clemency. Quite 
obviously, he did. At the time Woodard requested clemency he was 
still a living, breathing human being. If clemency were denied he 
would be executed and he would lose his life. As such, Woodard 
stood to lose his life - a grievous loss and certainly something 
tangible - and therefore he had a life interest in the clemency 
proceeding. 147 
A majority of the justices in Woodard supported the view that there 
is a life interest in capital clemency. 14S However, as in a number of 
other recent decisions, a clear majority opinion did not stand behind 
143 See id. at 465. 
144 See Woodmd, 523 U.S at 280 ("Respondent's claim of a broader due process interest in 
Ohio's clemency proceedings is barred by Dumschat."). 
145 !d. at 281. 
146 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (citation omitted). 
147 For a contrary view see Phillip John Strach, Note, Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. 
Woodard: B1eathi'flg New "Life" into an OldFoU7leenth Amendment Contmve1sy, 77 N.C. L. REV. 891, 
922-25 (1999). 
148 See Woodmd, 523 U.S. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) ("A prisoner under a death 
sentence remains a living person and consequently has an interest in his life."); id. at 292 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is abundantly clear that 
respondent possesses a life interest protected by the Due Process Clause."). 
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this proposition. 149 Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist's lead plurality 
opinion in Woodard stated that there was no life interest in capital 
clemency, while the five justices who supported the life interest were 
scattered in concurring and dissenting opinions. Thus, while a 
majority of the Court supported the proposition that there is a life 
interest in capital clemency, the salience of that proposition is 
limited by the lack of a clear majority opinion. When presented with 
another case involving capital clemency, these five justices should 
stand together in a m~ority opinion to announce that there is a life 
interest. 
B. How Much Process Is Due? 
Having concluded that a prisoner has a life interest in his capital 
clemency hearing, the next question is how much due process 
protection should attach to the clemency hearing? The Court has 
explained that "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards 
call for the same kind of procedure."150 Rather, "[t]he extent to 
which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is 
influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer 
grievous loss;' and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in 
avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary 
adjudication."151 . 
The range of potential due process protection is quite broad. On 
the low end, Justice O'Connor remarked in Woodard that some 
"minimal" procedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings.152 
Similarly, in Superintendent v. Hill, the Court concluded that a prison 
disciplinary board taking away good time credits153 could satisfy due 
149 Perhaps the most notable example of a fractured Rehnquist Court opinion is Hmew v. 
Collms, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). In Henew the lead opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
found that freestanding claims of actual innocence were not cognizable on habeas corpus, thus 
strongly suggesting that the Constitution does not forbid the execution of an innocent person. 
However, when all the votes are counted in Hmeta, six of the nine justices explicitly rejected 
the idea that the Constitution would tolerate the execution of an innocent person. As in 
Wooda1d, those justices were apparently unable to form a majority opinion that explicitly stated 
this proposition. 
150 M on isscy, 408 U.S. at 481. 
151 Goldbetg, 397 U.S. at 263 (citation omitted) . 
152 Woodmd, 523 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) . 
153 Good time credits are reductions in a prisoner's sentence for good behavior. For 
instance, for every day that a prisoner complies with the prison's rules without a disciplinary 
infraction he may receive one day of good time to count toward serving his sentence such that 
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process as long as "some evidence" supported the decision. 154 On the 
opposite extreme from "minimal procedural safeguards" and "some 
evidence" is substantive due process. Substantive due process forbids 
the government from doing certain things even if proper procedures 
are employed. In between these two extremes is the large middle-
zone of plain-old regular due process. 
At the outset we should be able to eliminate the minimum and 
maximum due process extremes. Providing only minimal due 
process protection for clemency petitioners discounts the 
importance of capital clemency. The Supreme Court has observed 
that clemency is the fail safe of the criminal justice system. This 
strongly suggests - contrary to Chief Justice Rehnquist's view - that 
clemency is an integral part of the criminal justice process. If the 
clemency petitioner is not guaranteed regular due process rights -
such as the rights to introduce evidence or to present his case before 
the clemency board- it is difficult to see how this integral part of the 
criminal justice process can operate effectively. 
Conversely, substantive due process protection of capital clemency 
is also inappropriate. A substantive due process clemency right 
would guarantee the existence of state and federal clemency 
mechanisms and would require the chief executive to award 
clemency when certain circumstances are met. (For example, 
clemency might be mandatory when the petitioner's IQ is below 70.) 
Moreover, if petitioners had substantive due process entitlements to 
clemency in certain situations, then the petitioner would have the 
right to appeal the merits of his case to the courts if the chief 
executive refused to grant clemency. 155 Whether you believe Justice 
Holmes that clemency is "a part of the Constitutional scheme,"156 or 
Chief Justice Marshall that clemency is an "act of grace," 157 there 
an eight-year sentence could be served in four years. See LYNN S. BRANHAM & SHELDON KRANTZ, 
THE LAW OF SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 177-78 ( 1997) . 
154 472 u.s. 445,447 (1985). 
155 Imagine that the Supreme Court held that capital defendants have a substantive due 
process right to clemency if they have an IQ below 70. Then imagine the following clemency 
hypothetical: Petitioner's counsel provides the chief executive with evidence demonstrating 
that the petitioner had an IQ of 65. The chief executive declines to grant clemency and claims 
that the petitioner's evidence does not conclusively show that he has an IQ below 70. 
Petitioner would then appeal this rejection to the courts. The court would then have to make 
its own independent a determination whether the petitioner has an IQ below 70. 
156 Biddle v. Perovich , 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) . 
157 United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833) . 
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seems little doubt that substantive clemency decision-making power 
has resided within the executive branch. 158 As such, substantive due 
process protection of clemency would seem inappropriate. 
Instead, clemency should fall in the large middle zone of plain-old 
regular due process. This of course does not tell us much. A helpful 
starting point, though, is Professor Daniel Kobil's explanation that 
due process can be satisfied only if capital clemency requests are 
given "meaningful consideration by the ultimate decisionmaker."159 
We can focus our due process analysis then on what will be needed to 
ensure "meaningful consideration." 
C. What Procedural Guarantees Should Due Process Afford? 
Meaningful consideration should surely include the opportunity 
for the petitioner fully and fairly to make his case. This should 
include the right to present evidence and the right to make a 
statement on his own behalf. 160 Though the Supreme Court in 
Woodard refused to guarantee these safeguards, the rights to present 
evidence and to make a statement do not seem very controversial. 161 
More controversial is the question of whether the petitioner 
should be entitled to counsel at the clemency hearing. The Supreme 
Court's test on this matter is whether the proceeding is a "critical 
stage in the prosecution."162 The Court's claim that clemency is the 
fail safe of the criminal justice system suggests that clemency hearings 
are a critical stage of the criminal justice process and therefore that 
counsel should be required. However, in recent years the Court has 
158 See Abramowitz & Paget, supw note 48, at 140-41. Some clemency power however is 
vested in the federal legislative branch. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896) 
(explaining that although the Constitution vests the president with the pardoning power, 
Congress is permitted to pass acts of general amnesty). 
159 Daniel T. Kobil, Due Pwr.ess in Death Penalty Commutations: Life, Libetty, and the Pwsuit of 
Clerneru.y, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 201, 218 (1993) (emphasis omitted). 
160 This procedural guarantee has been suggested previously. See Deborah Leavy, Note, A 
Maller of Life and Death: Due P1vcess Pmlection in Cap•tal Clerneru.y Pwceedings, 90 YALE LJ. 889, 
909-10 (1981). 
161 Of course, the existence of the due process rights to present evidence and to make a 
statement were among the things controverted in Woodatd. Moreover, the Court clearly 
rejected the conclusion that due process guaranteed the right to present evidence and the 
right to make a statement. Nevertheless, if we were to move out of Justice O'Connor's 
"minimal procedural safeguards" regime and Chief Justice Rehnquist's "no procedural 
safeguards" regime and instead consider clemency as something deserving of regular due 
process protection, I suggest that the rights to present evidence and to make a statement would 
be non-controversial. 
162 See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967). 
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been reluctant to mandate the assistance of counsel in post-trial 
proceedings. In discretionary163 and collateral appeals, 164 even in 
death-penalty cases, 165 the Court has been unwilling to find that 
counsel is so critical as to be required by the Due Process Clause. 
Under these precedents, it is unlikely that the Court, even applying 
regular (as opposed to minimal) due process protection, would 
require counsel at clemency proceedings. (Of course, one could 
argue that the decisions denying the right to counsel in discretionary 
and collateral appeals are incorrect, but that is a project beyond the 
scope of this paper. 166) Still, there are countervailing reasons to 
require counsel at clemency proceedings. Governors grant clemency 
for a variety of reasons, including new evidence of the petitioner's 
innocence167 and mental illness of the prisoner. 168 The question 
then is whether we can expect a mentally ill or innocent prisoner to 
be able fully to present his request for mercy? The answer is almost 
surely no. Without the assistance of counsel, many death-row 
inmates may be unable to explain convincingly why new evidence 
shows that they are innocent. 169 Because one of the primary 
functions of executive clemency is to prevent the execution of 
innocent or less culpable individuals, the case for guaranteeing 
counsel at the clemency stage is compelling. 170 
Thus far I have maintained that due process should require the 
assistance of counsel as well as the opportunity for the petitioner to 
present evidence and to make a statement. The most difficult 
question, however, is whether due process should guarantee the 
petitioner the right to make his case for clemency to the final 
l63 SeeRossv. Moffitt, 417U.S. 600 (1974). 
164 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) . 
165 SeeMurrayv. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) . 
166 For such an argument in the capital context, see Daniel Givelber, The Right to Counsel in 
Collalera~ Post-Convit.tion Pwuedings, 58 Mo. L. REv. 1393 (1999) . 
167 New evidence of innocence surfaces more frequently than one might expect. See, e.g., 
MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL 
CASES (1992) . 
168 See, e.g., Gilmme Gwnts Swarm Clemency; Senttmce Commuted to Life Without Pa1ole, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 13, 1999, atAl. 
169 For an early assessment of the importance of counsel in this regard, see Yale Kamisar, 
The Right to Counsel and the Fou1teenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pemasive Right " of an 
Accu . .o,ed, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1962). 
170 One observer has gone even further by suggesting not only the assistance of counsel, 
but also the assistance of psychiatric personnel and criminologists. See Leavy, supw note 160, at 
910. 
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decision-maker. As explained in Part I.C, there is a diffusion of 
responsibility for clemency decisions within the executive branch. In 
many states the chief executive makes the final determination about 
whether to grant clemency. However, the clemency petitioner 
almost never has an opportunity to present his petition directly to the 
governor. Similarly, in Texas- where the governor can only grant a 
commutation upon the recommendation of a majority of the pardon 
board - the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles never meets as a 
unitary body, and the petitioner therefore has no face-to-face 
opportunity to present his request for mercy to the Board. As such, 
in the majority of capital clemency petitions, the prisoner does not 
have the opportunity to present his clemency request directly to the 
primary decision-maker. This arguably does not comport with due 
process. 
If clemency petitioners are entitled fully and fairly to present their 
case for clemency, due process should require that they be able to 
present their cases to the actual person(s) making the final 
decision. 171 This at first seems like an unreasonable requirement 
given that governors are very busy and may not have time to attend 
clemency hearings. Such an objection is not particularly forceful, 
however. While it is true that governors spend a full day solving 
administrative crises, cutting ribbons, and generally governing, they 
arguably do nothing more important than presiding over their state's 
execution of a living human beingP2 Thus, a busy schedule should 
not be an excuse. Moreover, on a practical level, such hearings will 
not be very time-consuming. In Texas, the state with by far the 
largest number of executions per year, the main decision-maker in 
the first round of the clemency process is the Texas Board of Pardons 
and Paroles. Because the governor cannot grant clemency without 
171 The Arizona Supreme Court came to a similar realization forty years ago. See McGee v. 
Arizona State Board of Pardons and Paroles, 376 P.2d 779 (Az. 1962). The Mt.Gee court 
ordered a capital clemency hearing before the Pardons Board and remarked that "[d]ue 
process of law requires notice and opportunity to be heard, and there must be a hearing in a 
substantial sense. And to give the substance of a hearing ... the officer who makes the 
determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them." Id. at 781. 
172 See Austin Sarat, Capital Punishment as a Fact of Lega~ Politica~ and Cultwal Life: An 
lntwduction in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLJTIGS, AND CULTURE 4 
(Austin Sarat ed., 1999) ("Along with the right to make war, the death penalty is the ultimate 
measure of sovereignty and the ultimate test of political power.") (citation omitted); Andrew 
Sullivan, Watch It, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 30, 2001, at 8 ("The taking of a human life ... is the 
most profound act any human being can commit. To sanction it blithely, to acquiesce in it 
easily, to endorse it but not confront it, constitutes moral abdication.") 
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the pardon board's recommendation, the board in effect is the 
primary decision-maker, and therefore the due process scheme I 
have promulgated would require the pardon board to hear the 
petitioner's in-person request for clemency. This of course is not a 
burdensome requirement because the pardon board's primary 
function is to hear requests for clemency.173 Only if the pardon 
board recommends clemency (thus enabling the governor of Texas 
to potentially grant clemency) would due process then require the 
governor to entertain an in-person request for clemency. Given that 
the pardon board has only recommended clemency in a death 
penalty case once in the last seventeen years, 174 the burden on the 
governor's time is at most negligible and likely non-existent. 175 
The time burden will be somewhat greater in states in which the 
governor always has the final decision whether to grant clemency. 
Again, however, the time-burden would still be relatively minimal. In 
comparison to Texas, other states execute relatively few prisoners. In 
2000, Oklahoma followed Texas with eleven executions; Virginia had 
the next most active death-chamber with eight executions; while 
Florida trailed closely behind with six executions. 176 Interestingly, as 
in Texas, the governor of Oklahoma cannot grant clemency without 
the recommendation of the clemency board. 177 Thus, the Oklahoma 
governor would not have to attend any clemency hearings unless the 
pardon board recommended clemency. Therefore, in 2000, the 
heaviest burden would have fallen on the governors of Virginia and 
Florida, who would have had to preside over seven and six clemency 
hearings, respectively. This is hardly an overwhelming burden. 178 
173 At least one Texas legislator agrees. Rodney Ellis introduced a bill to require public 
hearings before the Board in death-penalty cases but it died in committee. See sup-ra notes 88-
89 and accompanying text. 
174 See Amnesty International Report, sujna note 81. 
175 Moreover, the Texas governor would already seem to have more free time than the 
nation's other governors. See Clay Robison, Lawmakers Push New Cortstitution, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Dec. 5, 1998, at Al. ("The Texas governor's office, in terms of formal powers, is now 
considered one of the weakest in the country."). 
176 Executions in tlte U.S. 2000, :.ufna note 52. 
177 See Facts About Clemency, sujna note 39. 
178 In Florida, for instance, attorneys for the state and for the prisoner are each granted 
fifteen minutes to make their cases. The victim's family is permitted to make a statement for 
up to five minutes. See Joseph B. Schimmel, Comment, Commutatwn of the Death Senteru.e: Flmida 
Steps Back F10m]ustiu and Meny, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 253, 282 (1992). If the prisoner is given 
the additional right to make a statement and to present new evidence of innocence, the 
proceeding may exceed one hour, but it will still remain quite brief. 
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*** 
In sum, I have outlined fairly rigorous due process protection for 
clemency proceedings. While petitioners would not have a 
substantive right to appeal a denial of clemency, they would have the 
right to present evidence and a personal statement to the clemency 
board, the right to the assistance of counsel, and, most importantly, 
the right to make their clemency plea in person to the primary 
decision-maker(s). This somewhat rigorous due process protection 
for capital clemency serves two goals. On the one hand, ensuring a 
fair clemency hearing with procedural protections provides the 
petitioner with the opportunity to plead for his life. Giving the 
petitioner this opportunity allows him fairly to exercise his "life 
interest" in the clemency proceeding. On the other hand, not 
permitting appeals of the substantive clemency decision leaves the 
final decision with the chief executive. This requires the chief 
executive to take responsibility for the decision to deny (or grant) 
clemency. Moreover, the requirement that a petitioner be able to 
present his clemency petition to the primary decision-maker(s) 
reinforces the decision-makers' responsibility. Thus, these due 
process protections enable the petitioner actively to protect his life 
interest in the clemency process while at the same time reinforcing 
that the chief executive bears the ultimate responsibility for denying 
(or granting) clemency. 
These due process protections can be seen as a compromise on 
the competing views of how clemency is characterized. Chief Justice 
Marshall179 and Chief Justice Rehnquist180 have argued that clemency 
is just an act of grace on the part of the executive. Conversely,Justice 
Holmes suggested that clemency "is a part of the Constitutional 
scheme,181 and the current Court has called clemency the "fail-safe" 
of the criminal justice system. 182 Requiring procedural safeguards at 
the clemency hearing but not permitting substantive appeals of the 
clemency decision strikes a balance between the two divergent views 
of clemency. It leaves the final act of grace with the executive, but 
179 See United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833). 
180 See Ohio v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 282 (1998). 
181 Biddle, 274 U.S. at 486. 
182 Henew, 506 U.S. at 415. 
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recognizes that clemency is an integral part of the criminal justice 
system that must be operated in a procedurally fair manner. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a diffusion of responsibility in capital clemency. The 
Court has concluded that clemency is solely a matter for the 
executive branch. Some governors however have tried to avoid this 
responsibility by claiming that the matter should be left to the courts 
or that they are just following the pardon board. In some instances 
neither the governor, the pardon board, nor the courts are willing to 
take responsibility for clemency and executions. This diffusion of 
responsibility is dangerous. Governors, pardon boards, and the 
courts might not stop questionable executions because they believe it 
is someone else's responsibility to do so. If clemency is to be the fail 
safe against improper execution, these entities must take 
responsibility for denying (or granting) clemency. The first step is 
for the Court to take responsibility by mandating procedural 
safeguards: the rights of the petitioner to present evidence, to make a 
statement, to have the assistance of counsel, and to appear before the 
final decision-maker(s). These procedural safeguards will eliminate 
the diffusion of responsibility by forcing the final decision-makers in 
the executive branches to take responsibility for the substantive 
decision to decline (or grant) clemency. 
